

First, the treaty does not actually require the United States or Russia to destroy any nuclear warhead. Either side may comply with the provisions of the treaty simply by "deactivating" the warhead and placing it in storage for possible redeployment. And, each side reserves the right to decide what exactly "deactivation" means.

This runs counter to the whole point of reducing the dangers of nuclear weapons by eliminating them once and for all. Have we really made a step forward in securing a better world for ourselves and future generations if both sides can re-arm at a moment's notice? And have we really made progress if the actual number of warheads destroyed is rather small?

Russia, for one, simply can not afford to maintain its current number of strategic nuclear warheads. But I am concerned that if we do not actively destroy more of our strategic nuclear warheads, Russia may feel compelled to keep more of its own, thus diverting valuable resources away from more pressing needs. And, I think everyone recognizes that Russia's ability to safely and securely store any warheads is far less than our own and the potential that they may fall into the wrong hands much higher.

Second, the treaty does not contain a detailed verification regime to judge compliance with its provisions. The treaty only mentions the creation of a Bilateral Implementation Commission that will meet twice a year. No more. The START Treaty, in contrast, contained provisions on detailed notifications, regular data exchanges, onsite inspections, and continuous monitoring of select facilities.

President Reagan was found telling his Soviet counterparts that when it came to reducing the number of nuclear weapons, his motto was "Trust, but verify." Though the Soviet Union is no more and Russia and the United States have a new relationship based on friendship and cooperation, I believe President Reagan's words still ring true.

Eliminating nuclear warheads is serious business and it is beneficial and, necessary, even for friends, to closely monitor, and verify, the progress of each side. We will enhance and deepen the trust and cooperation between Russia and the United States by doing so. So, I would urge the administration to use the Bilateral Implementation Commission as a forum for negotiating a detailed verification regime.

Third, there is no timetable for implementation and no mileposts to judge progress before the Treaty expires. The only date and milepost mentioned is the deadline to reach 1,700 to 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012.

Thus, over a 10-year period, with no verification regime, we will have no indication on how Russia is achieving the goals of the treaty until the very day it is bound to reach those goals. And then the treaty expires unless both sides agree at some point to extend it.

Again, trust and cooperation are built on verification and openness. I urge the administration to press for detailed timetables and mileposts to ensure that both sides are actively complying with the provisions of the treaty and will reach the final marker at the stated time.

Fourth, the treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons. As my colleagues know, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the number, location, and secure storage of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Smaller and more portable than strategic nuclear weapons, they are vulnerable to theft or sale to terrorist groups. Yet, the treaty does not even mention them.

This is a glaring oversight and the dangers posed by tactical nuclear weapons—especially now in the post-September 11 world of global terrorism—warrants the immediate attention and action by both Russia and the United States. I urge the administration to press for an accurate accounting of and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear warheads and to work towards reducing their number.

Finally, the treaty does not address the alert status of our nuclear forces. I offered, and withdrew, an amendment to address this issue earlier. Suffice to say that I am very concerned that in this era of a new relationship between the United States and Russia, we still keep our nuclear weapons on high alert or hair trigger status. This greatly increases the chances of an accidental or unauthorized launch or miscalculation which would result in unthinkable devastation.

Clearly there are problems with this treaty but I will vote for ratification because it is a step forward towards the goal of reducing the dangers posed by strategic nuclear weapons.

But there is a lot of work to be done to make this Treaty truly worthwhile. As our former colleague Senator Sam Nunn stated in hearing held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Moscow Treaty:

If [the Treaty] is not followed with other substantive actions it will become irrelevant at best and counterproductive at worst.

I hope the administration will take these words to heart and get to work on the important issues left out of the treaty so that we will be able to leave a world for future generations safer from the horror of nuclear war.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this resolution of ratification for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, otherwise known as the Moscow Treaty.

This treaty is a masterstroke. It represents, and, I am sure, will be sent as ushering in a wholly new approach to arms control for a wholly new era. The simplicity of this treaty is a marvel. It is extremely brief, indeed just three pages long. It is shorn of the tortured benchmarks, sublimits, arcane definitions and monitoring provisions that

weighed down past arms control treaties.

This is for a very good reason. The simplicity and brevity of this treaty reflect the simple fact that the US and Russia have moved beyond the enmity of the cold war era. The treaty recognizes this fact. It assumes a degree of trust between nations that are no longer on the precipice of war. Indeed, this treaty is the ultimate confirmation of the fact that arms control does not lead to real peace; rather, real peace—in this case made possible by a democratic transformation in Russia—leads to arms control.

The old cold war approach to arms control treaties is clearly outmoded. Can anyone truly believe that a 700-page behemoth like the START I treaty is relevant to today's situation? Clearly, such an approach would not reflect today's radically changed political and strategic environment. As such, it would not serve America's real security needs.

This treaty does. The most important thing to remember about this treaty is that it was negotiated after the United States independently determined the number of strategic warheads that were needed for our security. The outcome of the negotiations with Russia simply ratified our own prior determination. This is in stark contrast to the old approach to arms control, whereby arms control agreements preceded and ultimately drove our military and strategic decisions.

The long lead time for achieving reductions and the lack of sublimits and interim benchmarks in the treaty also serve our interests by preserving much needed flexibility. Looking at the fluid, almost chaotic, situation in the world today, with new threats having arisen in just the past year or so—attacks on our homeland, nuclear weapons developments in North Korea and Iran—one can foresee that circumstances could easily change over the next decade. If circumstances and threats change, so too might our strategic nuclear requirements. Thus, it is only prudent that we not box ourselves in. The drafters of this treaty in the Bush administration were wisely cognizant of that fact.

Mr. President, this treaty—and the forward-looking, post-cold war mindset that serves as its basis—deserves our strongest support. I urge my colleagues to approve this resolution of ratification.

Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I support ratification of the Moscow Treaty without any amendments or further conditions set upon it by the Senate. Ratifying this resolution as it was unanimously reported out of the Committee on Foreign Relations is the right thing to do.

This treaty is a tremendous step forward in the effort to make this world a safer place. This is especially significant in light of all that is going on in the world with our fight against terrorism. It is especially important and